Feudal wars and wars of conquest were characteristic conflicts in Catalonia in the 12 th century and led to a consolidation of the aristocratic military and political leaders. Among these, the highest power was the count or the king, who extended his domination and led the process of expansion through such novel formulae as pacification, the formation of armies and pacts with foreign leaders. The counts and the king used military agents from outside the regional aristocratic interests, implemented new military policies and found ideological or legislative resources to support their pre-eminence in military deployment. The rise of the cities, the towns and the defence or occupation of the conquered frontiers contributed to the reformulation of the military system, which broke the almost exclusive hold of the noble families on military activity. However, the members of the latter ruled and fought in regional settings, focussing their military activity on the defending and acquiring patrimony, as well as on establishing their jurisdiction. The concepts of heritagisation, dominating and fighting were assimilated into a single reality, and even became interchangeable. Meanwhile, conquests guided by providence placed the "inevitability" of the conquest, acquisition or "liberation" of al-Andalus on another plane. 
caPItalIa Verba
Bellum, Cathalonia Mediaevalis, Aristocratia, Principes Militares.
Presentation 1
Warfare in Catalonia was transformed in the 12 th century with a redefinition of aristocratic relations and military and political leadership.
2 Until then, links between members of the chivalrous nobility had committed them to military duties and configured the basic structure of political relations. Throughout the century, some notable lineages came to dominate the land to the detriment of other aristocratic families, although they became more dependent on other powers with greater political projection. Thus, the hierarchy was imposed on the new structure of aristocratic relations, which was facilitated by the county or royal authority. 3 The latter reinforced their leadership by organising and leading the main military activities or conquests in Catalonia, but also the peace. Moreover, other actors, linked to the Church or the cities, participated in the above-mentioned military transformation and the appearance of new levels of government. 4 War had been an almost exclusive question of the exercise of power by the chivalrous aristocracy with territorial roots. 5 However, during the 12 th century, other dominant groups in society began to define and control this. The covenants and laws, and new ideas about violence also favoured new military and political developments. 6 The containment of violence, 7 and the control and administration of newly conquered lands were the key elements of the deployment of emerging 
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th century catalonia. aristocracy and political leadership powers, which took place in the context of economic growth and changes in the geopolitics of the Iberian Peninsula. 8 However, military, and to an extent political, leadership remained mainly in the hands of the aristocracy on a territorial level, except in the areas of the New Catalonia, such as the frontiers or the cities. The noble families resisted their loss of military control to other political bodies, such as the count or the king, thus generating conflicts and a certain sharing of fields of influence.
This contribution analyses the characteristics and changes in the Catalan military processes in the 12 th century. In this sense, the near monopoly on military activity held by the territorial lords gave way to new actors, and a more complex system of domination arose with renewed political leaderships, like that exercised by the county power. For the purposes of this study, attention is paid to the changes in the typology and formulae in the documentary sources, with the aim of analysing the phenomenon of war through the expressions and registers used in the written records. This, the words and documentary formulae are taken as "signs" of the reality expressed. Thus, over the first third of the 12 th century, the relations of power were established through the convenientiae (feudal-vassalistic pacts) and the oaths of loyalty that governed military obligations among the members of the aristocracy. From the mid 12 th century, there was an increase in town charters, with regional variables, and a fall in the number of vassalistic pacts. In that phase, much fewer military obligations were demanded than in the early part of the century. Moreover, many beneficiaries of the documents were from non-noble social groups, reflecting the social and political transformations and changes in warfare. In parallel, differences between feudal powers were resolved with letters of pacification in the first third of the century, but these were replaced by judgements from mid century on.
Utterances about military activity have been addressed as the uses of words very clearly reflect the contemporary understanding of the various developments in warfare, as well as its social and political aspects. In this sense, the epigraphs chosen here are faithful to most repeated words in the lexis of the sources and show the main concepts that defined warfare for 12 th century men. These were: "guerra" (war) applied to various realities, exercitus (army), pacificare (pacification) as a limitation or ordination of war, military leadership as control of the war and castra (fortifications) as the principal symbol of military domination. The approach deliberately stays away from a statist analysis of medieval politics and warfare and, as a result, from a concept of war of great events or as the result of a certain political strategy has preponderated. 9 The expansive ephemeris of the County of 8. For the first half of the 12 th century in Castile and the peninsular context, Reilly, Bernard. The kingdom of León-Castilla under king Alfonso VII (1126 -1157 . Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. A concise approach to the 12 th century, but attentive to the political and territorial changes, Estepa, Carlos. "El dominio político hispanocristiano en el Occidente peninsular (910-1369)", La historia peninsular en los espacios de frontera: las "extremaduras" históricas y la "transierra" (siglos XI-XV), Francisco García Fitz, Juan Francisco Jiménez, coords. Madrid-Murcia: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales-Editum, 2012: 17-45 and 33-37. 9. Without wishing to enter into the debate, for an illustrative example of this kind of history of medieval war as a typical series of battles and confrontations between great political formations, Carey, Bryan
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Barcelona were undoubtedly a milestone in the military and political changes, ones which contributed to the definition of the county political leadership, although the military control of the territory had been and continued to be a major source of power. It was mainly the aristocracy that exercised this military function, although in response to the great military, territorial and economic changes, other agents were added from the mid-12 th century. These pages show how war was a leading, if not the most important, source of power and how it attracted political legitimacy, here following a different approach, one basically opposed to the idea of C. Von Clausewitz. 
Wars, army and pacification
War was the source of the power for the various actors in the political domination, and the transformation of military activity in the 12 th century went hand in hand with the changes in political leadership. In the Catalan documentation, the word "guerra" (war) was used to denominate a varied typology of military activities, although it recurrently referred to the feudal conflicts. This use reflects how these military developments were central to the collective "imaginary" of the epoch. In contrast, the use of other terms to refer to larger scale confrontations, such as facere exercitum (form an army) or (acquirere) echoed their special or exceptional assessment of the conquests.
The word guerregare/guerrejare (to fight or make war) generally appeared among the obligations of the vassal, put in writing either in the convenientiae or the oaths of allegiance from the first third of the 12 th century. 11 The vassal agreed to fight for the possessions of the lord and this was expressed in the terms: tenere, defendere et Todd. Warfare in the Medieval World. Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2009. This does not detract from appreciating the book as a contribution to the study of the tactics and techniques of war. In the Spanish context, the processes of Christian conquest and their political developments remain the main subjects of study in the analysis of warfare and high-medieval policy. Undoubtedly, the larger ones had a major impact, but local or feudal war was a permanent fixture, actively or passively, and crucial in the power relations within feudal societies. Its extent and transformation deserve more attention when describing what war and politics really were in these formations. 13 In some cases, the lord even retained the right to fight from the enfeoffed castle.
14
The vassal had to participate in other military-type activities, defined in specific terms, like hostes (the hosts), cabalgades (the rides/raids) and the formation of seguis (retinues/entourages). These commitments were contained in the oaths of allegiance.
15 Sometimes, the number of knights the vassals had to contribute to Maria Bonet these actions was stipulated, and this oscillated between two and five. One was even obliged to take twenty knights. 16 Very occasionally, it was stated that the help was for the host of Hispania -in other words al-Andalus-, that was designated as an extraordinary activity and distinct from the rides or hosts. 17 The troops provided by the vassals to the military retinues reflected that these were modest formations. The vassals sometimes had to pay for their maintenance, and other times, they received some kind of assistance from the lord, such as the animals. The fulfilment of military obligations by the vassals was reinforced and promoted in the Usatges, the laws compiled by the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer IV. 18 At the end of the 12 th century, King Alfonso the Chaste, Alfonso II of Aragon, exonerated the inhabitants of certain places from joining the hosts and rides. This change went hand in hand with the increase in his authority and in the context of the progressive relaxation of these obligations by some dependents. 19 The terms guerregare/guerrejare (make war/fight), servicia (military services), "hostis" (host/army) and "cabalgada" (ride/raid) were fundamentally linked to the duties of the vassal. In the framework of feudal-vassalistic relations, the idea of "war" referred to defending of the lord's possessions in the first third of the 12 th century. Moreover, the concepts of "having" or "acquiring" were applied to other warlike developments and thus, warfare was related unequivocally with the act of "heritagisation".
The word war was primordial for designating the struggle between lords in a territory or "feudal war", 20 Beyond the vassalistic obligations, the word "war" was used for the military actions of the lords in their lands as a generic term for regional conflict. Thus, the attack launched by the Count of Barcelona on his vassal, Berenguer Ramon de Castellet, in 1113 was qualified as such. Later, an agreement for pacification was reached as Berenguer Ramon de Castellet could no sufferre guerram comitis. 25 In the struggle for control of Tarragona, Guillem de Claramunt was accused of having made war on the city, territory and inhabitants of Tarragona in 1168. 26 Conflicts were sometimes very vicious and could affect all the population, as in Cardona, according to what Ramon Folch related to Pope Alexander III. 27 The uprising of the Muslims in the Tortosa area was called war, and it was feared that the guerra sarracenorum could paralyse the harvest in 1174. 28 The use of the term "war" identified the revolt at a regional level with other typical episodes of feudal war, surely given that both attacks affected the lord's power.
Given this evidence, it is seen that the word "war" was used for the feudal territorial conflicts in a profuse and generalised way, showing how war really was to the 12 th century. Moreover, it identified the attacks carried out by the Muslims, either 
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by conquered rebels or raids from Andalusian positions. 29 Finally, it was also used for larger conflicts, like the struggle between Genoa and Pisa, when King Alfonso II pledged to guerris faciam (make war) in favour of the Genoese. 30 It also referred to the "war" against King Lobo vel cum aliis sarracenis, undertaken by Alfonso II and the king of Navarre, Sancho the Strong.
31
The references to attacks against the Muslims from Catalan Christian lands contained singular expressions related to those used to name war. This peculiarity is evidence of the importance and, especially, the exceptionality with which the conquests of al-Andalus were seen. The providential idea of these expeditions was highlighted and it was common to use the expression facere exercitus (formation of an army) to name them. The language echoed a larger reality and the necessity for or "inevitability" of divine protection. 32 In the plans for offensives into Andalusian lands, formulae were used like quando vero, auxiliante Deo ipsa civitas Tortuosa in potestatem christianorum deveniat, quando Deus dederit Ilerdam in potestate christianorum, Ut Deus reddeat Lerida a cristianis or cum eam nos divina gratia adquirere voluerit et obtinere. 33 The providential character of the expeditions was added to the idea of "free the lands from the hands of the Muslim", as King Alfonso expressed it in the plan to conquer Majorca. 34 The actions against the Muslims or other foreign enemies were described as acquirere (to acquire), liberare (to loose) and were the result of facere exercitus (of gathering an army). Among the formulae used to name this type of fight, the word "war" was in a lower position than when used for the 29 ). In contrast, the peace with King Lobo would generate resources that would be shared out and that could generate "war" between the two kings, as was warned about. 32. "They will be conquered by God's will", "when God returns us", "when God will give Lleida into the power of the Christians". The conquests were the result of divine will, and this attribution had already been noted in 11 th century Catalan documentation, Sabaté, Flocel. "Frontera peninsular e identidad (siglos XI-XII)", Las Cinco Villas aragonesas en la Europa The term army described a military contingent with a large number of troops, especially compared with smaller formations that were used for raids, cavalcades or hosts. 36 The armies were mentioned in important military agreements, and to name the forces deployed against the Muslims.
37 The Count of Barcelona granted himself the power to gather the troops or the army to attack Hispania, as well as to negotiate peace and war with the Moors, as defended in the legislation in the Usatges. 38 The administration of war contributed to defining the count's authority over other powers, and attributed to the Muslims, or enemies, a primordial area for the execution of his leadership. 39 Thus, the king of Sicily had agreed to help the Count of Barcelona with an army and to join his army to attack Andalusian lands. 40 In the agreements for the conquest of Tortosa in 1146, the Genoese agreed to contribute an "army" to help Ramon Berenguer IV. This would be equipped with war machines given the scale of the siege and the importance of the alliance, as there is no reference to war machines in other agreements. 41 At the same time, the count declared that he would go with his army. 42 From the mid 12 th century, the phrase facere exercitus (to make an army) was also used as a synonym for the host. 43 Basically, the count of Barcelona could form these armies, made up of various contingents, such as the Templars. 
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The preparing and carrying out the conquests were extraordinary militarily and politically processes. These meant overcoming the concept of military domain by the modest aristocratic armed groups. Thus, in the run up to the conquest of Lleida in 1147, Count Ramon Berenguer IV encouraged the presence of a hundred men in Almenar, which was a spearhead for the advance on Lleida. The military purpose dominated the resettlement and required a large number of men, with the need for watches (guaitas) and supplies for two days in case of war. 45 The conquest was coming and the military necessities deferred the payment of the censuses until the fall of the city in favour of the military occupation of the site.
Count Ramon Berenguer IV sometimes rewarded the nobles who had participated in his armies. Pere de Puigverd claimed payment for having taken part in the army that had gone to Lorca with ten knights. He asked for 30 morabatins (Muslim coin) per month per person. However, the Count of Barcelona defended himself replied that he had already paid. 46 Bernat de Anglesola accused the count of having calling him up for an army that had gone to Aragon, where he had lost many goods. Ramon Berenguer IV denied it. 47 He also paid specialist troops, like crossbowmen, although these were few in number. 48 The count's leadership in these actions was buttressed by his ability to pay for military support beyond personal links. The count's financial power was greater than other lords, to a large extent due to the his access of the resources from the parias, which he dedicated to military activity and domination. So, he promised to pay 1,000 morabatins to the Hospitallers to erect a fortress in Amposta, at the mouth of the Ebro, and 2,000 and 1,000 morabatins to the Count of Urgell before and after the conquest of Lleida, as well as part of the parias. 49 The military changes came about through the increase in pressure on the frontier territories, with the conquests of the mid 12 th century and clearly after the occupation of the lands and cities of the New Catalonia, that required new forms of political and military organisation. In this sense, the Barcelona comital authority delegated the power to maintain peace and to make war to leading people in the conquered or frontiers areas. He had assumed that power and nevertheless he delegated it, even in places where he supposedly had deployed his authority. 50 In contrast, this type of demand did not appear in the town charters of Tortosa and Lleida, but rather loyalty to the count and containment of the feudal violence through the imposition of justice. 54 The people of Lleida confirmed that they would help the count to retain and hold the city, through a formula similar to the one a vassal pronounced to his lord, but without any reference to military obligation. Pacification was a necessity in the occupied cities. Moreover, since the middle decades of the 12 th century, the requirements on a vassal to make war almost disappeared from enfeoffments and oaths of allegiance, coinciding with the consolidation of the peace movement. The royal and comital authorities made the idea of pacification their own, initially pressed by the bishops, and this changed from private places or jurisdictions to all the territory under the authority of the count or king. Alfonso the Chaste imposed a general peace in Catalan territory in 1173, because he claimed it was in the prince's power; bella sedare, pacem stablire.
55
The pre-eminent position of the Count of Barcelona or the King of Aragon in the administration of peace and war culminated in the establishment of relations of power with peninsular political leaders and others. Ramon Berenguer IV and King Alfonso attributed themselves the power negotiate peace and war in various agreements with the kings of Castile or Navarre. 56 The Treaty of Tudillén in 1151 between the Count of Barcelona and the King of Castile, Alfonso VII, was defined as a vera pax (lasting peace) and perpetua concordia (perpetual agreement). They divided the territories to be conquered in Al-Andalus, consistent with the fact that these expeditions were carried out under each one's political authority. 57 The peace and cooperation between Christian leaders created the conditions for the great military enterprises and the distribution of the areas of future conquests. However, the leadership of the Castilian king among the Christian kings and leaders in the Peninsula must be highlighted. This was especially clear in the times of the Emperor Alfonso VII, who, at certain times, obtained the vassalage of García Ramírez of Navarre, Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona and Alfonso I of Portugal. Castile's greater military power undoubtedly contributed to a certain preponderance of that kingdom. 59 Beyond
60
Feudal war continued to be fundamental when settling the authority over the land, although pacification, the resort to justice and especially the new needs generated by the conquests, forced a gradual reduction of violent acts under the emerging political authority. The pacifying measures coexisted with the lords' right to make war in the territory, and the coexistence of these models generated contradictions. One arrangement by King Alfonso aimed at pacifying the roads in Catalonia established a pair of exceptions. Peace on the roads could be affected if there were war between knights or action by the lords whose domains the roads crossed.
61 Thus, the pacifying legislation assimilated feudal war and the abuses of the lords within their jurisdictions, although it simultaneously sought to pacify the communication routes. 
Military and political leadership
The Catalan aristocracy was reorganised and established its relationship through oaths of allegiance or "conveniencias" in the 12 th century. This reinforced the leading lineages, such as the counts of Barcelona or the viscounts of Cardona. 62 There were other types of agreement, like the so-called "pacification", sometimes identified with a truce, which re-established relations between lords and, significantly, among the Catalan magnates. Moreover, pacification settled differences between members of the territorial aristocracy. 63 These solutions ended feudal confrontations, often about property or jurisdictions. 64 The pacification agreements fit into the pacifying movement, which grew from various levels of political power, such as the ecclesiastic, the counts and the cities, with legal and judicial measures.
The leading powers extended their leadership through the processes of pacification, although these usually involved military solutions, as was the case of the Count of Barcelona. Thus, Ramon Berenguer III strengthened his power in the Viscounty of Béziers through "pacification", and promised to help Viscount, Bernat Ató militarily against other leading lords, namely the Count of Toulouse or the King of Aragon and in the reconquest of places like Carcassonne or Rases. 65 In another pacification in 1127, the count imposed conditions on Ponç II, Count of Empúries, to correct his abuses. 66 His men had committed abuses against the church of Girona, or travellers from the County of Barcelona, like those on their way to the fair in Peralada. Peace was associated with the ecclesiastical patrimony and such specific places as the roads, hence the criminalization of the mentioned acts, which were contrary to peace. The count of Empúries had to pay a fine of 3,000 sueldos to maintain the truce, destroy the castle he had built in Castelló de Empúries, and hand over hostages as a guarantee of compliance. 67 Ten years later, the counts of Barcelona and Empúries reached another "pacification", after the breaking of truces and mutual accusations. 
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Another peace agreement reached by dignitaries from the two counties of Pallars confirmed the necessity for agreements between magnates. The Count of Urgell, Ermengol VI, and the Count of Barcelona guaranteed this agreement, which highlighted their leadership within the Catalan high aristocracy. 69 Artal II and his brother from the Pallars Sobirà and Bernat Ramon of the Pallars Jussà, who had acted abusively in the neighbouring territories, agreed not to seize anything else and restore their jurisdictions. It seems that the pressure from the King of Aragon contributed to them closing ranks in benefit of peace.
70
The peaces or truces were not always respected, and with their knights, Viscount Arnau de Castellbó and Arnau de Saga assaulted around twenty-five places in Cerdanya, sacking, robbing, kidnapping and burning in 1188. The region was under a general peace agreement and the king enforced it again after these events. 71 Sometimes, and despite the references to queremoniae or armed conflicts, a lord re-established a vassal's authority by giving him new prerogatives or demanding compensation for him for damage caused by the wars. 72 The formula of pacification gave way to judicial solutions in mid century. In the second half of the 12 th century, Count Ramon Berenguer IV settled his differences with leading noble figures in judicial proceedings, as with Guillem Ramon de Montcada, his seneschal, Pere de Puigvert and Bernat de Anglesola to name a few, which was the result of his leadership. 73 The disputes or claims of the Count or King affected the conquered lands or regions of the March, Tortosa, Lleida and Tarragona, where they had deployed their military authority.
The preparations for and, especially the course of, the conquests in the middle of the century strengthened the leading role of the House of Barcelona. The projects for conquest promoted by the County of Barcelona evolved significantly and radically with the military changes of the time. In a first phase of these plans, the Count of Barcelona entrusted the possible occupation of Tarragona and Tortosa in 69 74 Given these circumstances, the role of the territorial aristocracy in the conquests was limited and submitted to the Count. So, the two cities were taken with the help of plural armies, war machines, extraordinary military aid, and after sieges that lasted several months. 75 The conquest of Tortosa (1148) was the main landmark in the military terrain, and provided the count with a level of political authority previously unknown. It was a military deployment without precedents in the Catalan counties, and which occurred in the context of the Second Crusade in the West. In this sense, it involved the presence of forces from the feudal West, like the Genoese navy, and required the use of siege machines.
76
Ramon Berenguer III had entrusted the conquest of Tortosa to the count of Pallars in 1097. This attempt was unsuccessful, and years later, the Count of Barcelona joined the conquest of the Balearic Isles thanks to an alliance with Pisa. This expedition, with Papal blessing for the Pisans as a crusade, was designed to put an end to the capture of Christians and the harm to trade inflicted by the Muslims on the Pisans from Majorca. According to the Pisan chronicle, the inclusion of the count of Barcelona was accidental. 77 In it, Ramon Berenguer III was named dux catalanensis, rector Catalanicus hostes, and together with the count of Empúries, he was called a "Catalan hero". 78 However, the Count of Empúries was not in Ramon Berenguer III's entourage when the agreement with the Pisans was reached. 
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leaders at the head of the Catalans, who had strained relationship. However, the Count of Barcelona appeared as the main Catalan military leader.
The conquest of Majorca was short-lived. Nevertheless, this event and the plans against Tortosa and Lleida, speaks eloquently of the interests of the County of Barcelona, spurred on by the mercantile interests of Barcelona and its rivalry with the Kingdom of Aragon, to seize the two cities. This was not about occupying any territory and the military objectives had been chosen carefully. Almost certainly, these operations would not have been successful with only the backing of the regional aristocracy, and were carried out with the help of other armies. This context of the need for more troops explains Ramon Berenguer III's request to the king of Sicily for help in 1128. The latter agreed to supply fifty ships with an "army of help", and in exchange, the count promised half of what they conquered. 80 In the context of collaboration with the Mediterranean naval powers, the count established an agreement with Genoa according to which the Genoese could cross and stay in his lands, and significantly, make "peace and war" on the Muslims. 81 It seems that Ramón Berenguer III understood that the success of his military operations depended on the technical assistance of the Italians, as finally came about with the participation of the Genoese in the conquest of Tortosa.
The count of Barcelona reached other agreements with foreign powers. In doing so, he partly dispensed with his nobles, and even indirectly curtailed the possible benefits for such magnates as the Count of Urgell. Among these agreements, one between Ramon Berenguer III with the Moorish governor of Lleida, Avifiel, stands out. The governor agreed to hand over various castles in the Lleida area and to become the Count's vassal, with the possibility of receiving honours in Lleida or Barcelona. Furthermore, he offered "to help him" militarily in the move against Tortosa and other Andalusian places, and also to share the parias. These solutions show the curious integration of the Muslim leader into Christian politics. 82 However, Avifiel must have been preparing his move to Majorca, given that the count agreed to supply him with twenty ships to transport two hundred knights between Christians and Muslims. 83 The reference reflects the existence of a navy under the control of the Count of Barcelona.
Ramon 85 The count of Barcelona entrusted part of what was conquered to his military reinforcements. This formula of sharing with those involved in the conquests was different from the traditional system used by counts and other military leaders of enfeoffing places before their conquest. Furthermore, the Count chose powers and institutions that were not linked to the local interests, and did so in detriment to the region's aristocracies. The donations to the Temple, and even to the Hospital, arose as compensation for the loss of political rights in the kingdom of Aragon. However, the orders soon complied with the objective of fighting the Moors. Thus, the military institutes were involved as agents of the Count's or King's authority in conquests, as well as in the occupation of conquered lands. Their specific mission of fighting against the Muslims favoured their inclusion in the expeditions, which was consistent with their special consideration. 86 In this sense, the crusading identity was also claimed as a sign of distinction of the Count's power and especially, his military charisma. In 1113, Ramon Berenguer III had taken the cross from the archbishop of Pisa, and his son, Ramon Berenguer IV, expressed his crusading mission in the resolution imposed on the Templars in 1143. 87 The idea of specialization or military specificity grew and this encouraged the involvement of military officers free of family or patrimonial interests whether these were from the military orders, or the Pisan, Sicilian or Genoese navies. The archbishop of Tarragona had a similar intention when he entrusted the occupation of Tarragona to a Norman knight. This way, the prelate dispensed with the consolidated lineages in the surroundings of the city, like the Claramunt, who soon became enemies. Then he instructed the Norman vassal to fight to defend Christianity, with clear crusading resonances, and in so doing, the pact going beyond a mere feudal-vassalistic agreement was forged. 88 There was the necessity to achieve greater military efficacy, and in turn, to restrict the activity of the lineages settled in the area. This happened in territories like the wilāyah of Siurana. After it fell, the Count led the repopulation and sidelined the Cervera family, who prevailed over the neighbouring region and had participated in the conquest of Siurana itself (1153-1154). 89 The Count of Barcelona used various policies to involve the Catalan nobles in the conquests. These were affirming his leadership in these initiatives, promoting the family lines close to the Count and impeding the promotion of lineages. He also reached agreements to ensure his military pre-eminence and link some Catalan magnates to the main enterprises. He sometimes managed to have some recognise him as the lord of the regions of Lleida or Tortosa once they fell, as the hostile Count of Empúries did. Furthermore, in the 1130 covenant, Ponç II of Empúries agreed to help him militarily. However, the Count of Barcelona had no intention of benefiting him, as he did with other members of the aristocracy who were loyal to him. Ponç was not a member of his circles, and they both left behind a series of conflicts, which escalated again later. 90 In the "conveniencias" in the first half of the 12 th century, the Catalan nobles confirmed their links to the Count of Barcelona. They expressed their commitment to help him to conserve the parias he received from Andalusian lands, and even the lands he might conquer. It was a different formula to the characteristic feudal-vassalistic pacts and in it, the vassals recognised the Count's power to receive the parias and administer the conquered lands.
91
The Count of Barcelona reached specific agreements with lords who were important for his military campaigns against Tortosa and Lleida, and his leadership prevailed among his magnates. Ramon Berenguer IV conceded the city and fortifications of Tortosa to William of Montpellier as a fief in 1136, in exchange for William's military involvement under his command. 92 Ten years later, he granted his seneschal, Guillem Ramon de Montcada, a third of Tortosa and the Balearic Isles. 93 However, Tortosa only fell thanks to the incorporation of contingents from far-off places and, especially, Genoese naval and military support. Ramon Berenguer IV formalised an agreement with Genoa for the conquest of Tortosa and the Balearic Isles in 1146, just when the Italian city reached another arrangement with the King of Castile to conquer Almería. 94 In the pact, the Count of Barcelona referred to the one between the Genoese and Alfonso VII, and stipulated that they would attack 90 51 and 52) . The agreement would have come a month after the one with Montcada, which reflects that the Count's solutions with the seneschal and the Genoese were complementary, a third for each of the three parties.
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th century catalonia. aristocracy and political leadership Tortosa and the Balearic Isles on their return from Almería. It was, in a way, a threeway agreement. These agreements allowed the Genoese to maintain colonies to consolidate their trade in the Western Mediterranean, and in exchange, they guaranteed the leadership of the Peninsula's military leaders. 95 The comital alliance with the Genoese had the backing of the leading figures of the Catalan nobility, who recognised the agreements and the count's command. The Genoese placed themselves under his authority, as they only besieged cities from the Ebro to Almería with his permission, and the Count would receive two thirds of everything seized. At the end of the contest, after the decisive participation of the Genoese, the city was divided into three, and the Count strengthened his position through the formula of partition and incorporating loyal people at the head of the city, such as the seneschal Montcada and the Templars. Finally, he acquired the Genoese part, which reflects how the count's military leadership favoured his political domination of the conquered lands.
96
Before the fall of Lleida, the Count of Urgell had taken up tactical positions around the city of Lleida with the aim of conquering it. This approach took place through enfeoffments in the Pla d'Urgell or places near Lleida. With these, his vassals were involved in the military tasks, or simply established his authority by renewing ties with prominent vassal lords. The military build-up in the region was fuelled by powerful lords in the years before the conquest, and significantly by Ermengol VI of Urgell. So, for example, the Count granted a "turrim destructam" (destroyed tower) in Bellcaire, and the beneficiaries were given the obligation to rebuild it. As an extraordinary situation, they were allowed to enjoy an income to finance the defence against the Muslims during the construction of the fortification, or until the fall of Lleida.
97
In the run up to the conquest of Lleida, the Count of Barcelona established a vassalistic pact with the Count of Urgell that gave him the military leadership of the operation and the domination of the city. Through that agreement and after the conquest, Ramon Berenguer IV limited of Ermengol VI's authority, because it converted the region, which had been the area of expansion of the County of Urgell, into a conquest of Barcelona. 98 The Count of Barcelona identified the conquests as territories under his authority and with a differentiated, military and frontier character, which translated into his entitlement as Marquis of Lleida and Tortosa, titles that might had military connotations as well as an honourable sense, especially because at the same time the traditional counties were getting obsolescence 99 . The asymmetric reality of the relation between the two counts was shown in a series of compensations that the Barcelona leader granted to the Count of Urgell. The great military events responded to the interests and objectives set from the County of Barcelona. The conquest of Tortosa, the most difficult, was the first, given that it was the most necessary and the most interesting in economic terms. Lleida would come later, and finally Siurana. The plan to conquer Majorca was present throughout the century, as was the one for Valencia at some moments, as King Alfonso the Chaste warned in 1176. This series of victories contrasts with the difficulties that the Count of Barcelona had to impose himself in territories where local lords prevailed, sometimes maintaining armed conflicts and others simply dominating.
Some regional lineages sought alliances or vassalistic allegiances and consolidated their power, also prior to the conquests. This happened in the Conca de Barberà, the Baixa Segarra, the Garrigas, and even in the Camp de Tarragona. The new security conditions derived from the taking of Tortosa and Lleida changed this panorama, or at least favoured divergences with the new political agents. These differences were revealed, for example, in the litigation by Bernat and Berenguer de Anglesola against Count Ramon Berenguer IV. The Anglesola claimed the domains they had been occupying between Anglesola and Lleida, although the Count defended himself by claiming that he had acquired them from the Muslims with the conquest of Lleida. He added that neither his grandfather, as the Anglesola claimed, nor he himself had granted these honours to them. In light of this news, seen as the prelude to the conquest, the Christian domains in the vicinity of Lleida were extended, but finally the Count of Barcelona was vindicated and validated these as his acquisitions to Muslims. 100 The authority of the Count or King did not always prevail, and they came to recognise that of lords of the territory who had been refractory to their authority, such as the Cambrils lineage.
Despite the difficulties, royal and county leadership over the territorial aristocracy was reinforced thanks to military developments. One must ask how the Count and King achieved their leadership. They reached this pre-eminence through agreements with other kings in the Peninsula, the control of the parias with the Moors, the pacts with the Italian powers, the reception of the crusading idea and the settlement of the "Battler"'s will, the administration and extension of the pacifying process, the submission of some important magnates, the renewal of many loyalties, the rise of the regular orders, especially the military ones, and also and especially, the consummation of their military leadership. Furthermore, the political hierarchy of the epoch, especially when the Count of Barcelona was also king, granted him the condition of military leader par excellence. Count Ramon Berenguer IV, especially after the conquest of Tortosa, and King Alfonso the Chaste participated in, or led, 
Fortifications and military policy
The fortifications were the axis of warfare in 12 th -century Catalonia, following the systematic military system in the feudal West based, above all, on siege warfare. 101 Thus, the fortresses or fortified towns were the centres of political authority in the territory. 102 The lords based their domination of a region on their castles and the enfeoffed ones. In addition, the comital power sought to achieve control of the fortifications, although the results were often mediocre. A principal element of the relation agreed between lords was the donation of the fief or castle to the vassal. Furthermore, these feudal-vassalistic agreements contained provisions for military services and the links that ruled the hierarchic structure of power. This way, the vassal specified the castles for which he owed allegiance through his oath.
Wars in 12 th century catalonia. aristocracy and political leadership the fortifications. The Count of Barcelona reserved the right to "give permission" for the building of fortifications, monasteries or churches, in a plan that was more theoretical than effective. 113 Thus, a sentence went against the building of castle by Galcerà de Salses sine litentia comitis, and appealed to the "usatge" to impose the wishes of Count Ramon Berenguer IV. 114 The consolidation of castles and lineages in regions neighbouring those that were going to be conquered were vital for later military developments, such as in the areas of Lleida or Siurana. Indeed, the erection, reconstruction and enfeoffment of fortresses in the regions near the city of Lleida was promoted years before its conquest. The military scheme of establishing counter-castles before enemy strongholds or cities was followed. These were safe bases from which to launch attacks to wear down the enemy positions before their conquest. 115 Some enfeoffments mention the fortress having to be built or rebuilt, for example in Bellester, Pujols Rubiols, Tarrés, or report that it was destroyed, with the aim of rebuilding or repairing it. 116 Lords interested in conquest, like the Count of Urgell, consolidated their authority through the enfeoffment of castles that were in the hands of other lords, as he did with Ramon Arnal, who had fortified Almenara. The Count of Urgell was aware of the position of some fortifications infra finibus marchiarum, and the need to establish vassalistic relations in these places to reinforce his authority. 117 The requirements to lend military duty were frequent in the enfeoffments or in donations in the Marches of the Counties of Urgell and Barcelona in the two decades prior to the conquests of Lleida and Siurana. 118 The "castralisation" or militarisation of the region responded to a defensive programme, but military reinforcement was also designed to attack Lleida. Thereby, the Templars were given the charge of "defending Christianity" from their castle of Barberà by the Count of Urgell in 1132, which was located in the region.
Maria Bonet
The Templars and Hospitallers were chosen with the aim of their developing military activity in the conquests and, significantly, in the domination of the occupied areas from imposing fortresses they obtained. From these, they defended the southern frontiers around the lower reaches of the Ebro. To give an idea, the military orders exercised their domain from the Suda of Tortosa, the castle of Gardeny in Lleida, and the fortresses of Amposta, Miravet, Ulldecona, Ascó and Horta, among others. The Count of Barcelona urged them to "ad propagandam sancte christianitatis fidem" and attacks the Muslim "infidels". 119 Moreover, he involved the Templars and Hospitallers in the conflicts, to obtain booty and Muslims, who had to be captured on the raids. 120 The orders became consolidated given their military skills against the Moors and, especially, in occupying their lands, which they did in the name of the county or royal authority.
From the mid 12 th century, there was a notable process of "castralisation" of the frontier lands, those occupied or re-feudalised and the conquered ones. The lords who led the occupation of regions like the Camp de Tarragona and the other conquered areas promoted the centralisation of power in a fortification or fortified place. There was a seigniorial push both to build fortifications and to reoccupy Andalusian castles and towers. In the Tarragona area, the beneficiaries of enfeoffed places where the population would gather were obliged to build fortifications. This happened in the enfeoffments of Mongons in 1149, Riudoms in 1151, where the lord would pay for half of the fortification, Cambrils in 1152, Salou in 1157, Albiol and Alforja in 1158, and also in Siurana in 1163, Rocabruna in 1171, or Picamoixons in 1171. 121 In the conquered areas of Tortosa, Lleida and Siurana, the county and royal donations placed the fortifications at the centre of territorial domination, granted fundamentally to loyal people and the military orders. 122 Castles were the focus of military domination, and by extension, the domain over the rural districts. Accordingly, they were also the main targets in power struggles. This is clearly seen in the judicial dispute between the Count of Barcelona and Pere de Puigvert in 1157 for various castles: Prenafeta, Piera and Barberà, or another Only in certain areas did the Count or his son manage to exert domination through delegates of their direct authority in the castles. In this sense, resort was made to such figures as the castellan. This representative went from being the holder of castles to being the king's representative in the territory with certain military and political rank, that was different from the figure of the vassal or the seigniorial castellan himself. In the Siurana area, King Alfonso the Chaste opted to delegate his power to a castellan, Albert de Castellvell. As a government official, the castellan of Siurana participated in the granting of population charters in the more mountainous parts of the demarcation. 124 This was specific situation in a region where the King asserted his rights of conquest against those theoretically acquired by the archbishop of Tarragona and exercised by other lords 125 In the neighbouring area of the Conca de Barberà, the Count and his son, the King, faced the resistance of the local lineages and promoted the founding of localities or fiefs to limit this. Thus, King Alfonso promoted a population centre in Montblanc, under the authority of his bailiff for some time and then under the rule of the castellan. The castellany was made up of Montblanc and La Riba in 1176-8. 126 The castellan held half the castle, although the king could use it and its dependencies militarily through the "hosting and the host". The figure of the castellan was consolidated as the king's representative with a specific military function, and the presence of this position spread to places that had other dominations. Thus, Alfonso the Chaste enfeoffed Conesa Castle to Ramon de Cervera, although he included his castellan in the concession and he also had to serve the king with his milites. 127 An agreement between the Count of Urgell and the King in 1187, established that et rex Aragon...mittat castlanum in predicta civitate Ilerde, as a way to exercise his power in the city. 
Conclusions
The concept of "war" was directly related to the defence or acquisition of patrimony, as seen recurrently in the documentation. The members of the aristocracy verbalised their commitment to fight for the lord's patrimony and to hold fiefs. Heritagisation, domination and fighting were concepts that could be assimilated to a single reality, and were even interchangeable. Thus, the term was especially identified with the defence of property in a more private sense than any other, and the expression "pacify" was applied to the restitution of seized property. In this context, the word "war" was used profusely to refer to the feudal war, the conflict par excellence in 12 th -century Catalonia, although it was also applied to other larger military confrontations. In parallel, the participation of the different powers in the fortifications reflected that these were the focus of domination and regional war. This way, the castle was the target of intervention by the lordly powers, lords and vassals, and the axis of the military policies in the domain of territories, like those policies applied by the county or royal powers. These both intervened in the territories through the push for "castralisation" and to link the holders of the castles as vassals.
The Christian plans and attacks on al-Andalus went by specific names, like the reference to the intervention of divine providence in favour of Christianity, the facere exercitus (forming of an army) and others like capere (conquer), adquirere (acquire), liberare (liberate), and also guerram facere (make war). The language expressed the exceptional and special nature of these other conflicts, as shown by their being defined as supernatural. In this context, it should be noted that the Count of Barcelona, Ramon Berenguer III, participated in the first large-scale Catalan attack, together with the Pisans, while also sharing the leading position with the Count of Empúries. Yet, the Count of Barcelona stood out for that fact that he had an "army", paid some of these forces and, it seems, had some naval capacity before the middle of the 12 th century. The Count of Barcelona's first plans for conquest included cooperation with some other count. However, these were replaced by projects that included the help of Italian contingents of specialised soldiers, like the military orders. In fact, he did not stand out in the military terrain until he managed to conquer Tortosa (1148), and he did so thanks to the special contributions of the Genoese, foreign fighters, the Templars and military techniques unknown until then in Catalonia, at least effectively and in combination, namely a navy and war machines. In this and subsequent operations, the Catalan aristocracy came under the military leadership of Ramon Berenguer IV, and to an extent, were relegated. Just one year later, the conquest of Lleida, which had been started by the County of Urgell, became another victory for the County of Barcelona, although with the participation and recognition of the rights of Urgell under his domain. Something similar happened with the conquest of the "wilāyah" of Siurana and which meant greater involvement of the Count of Barcelona in the region. The count had partially ousted the Count of Urgell, and clearly done the same to the lineages of the regions on the frontier of the newly-conquered lands, like the Anglesola, Cervera, and even the Puigvert families.
Shortly after the two most notable conquests of the mid-12 th century, and in the county legislation, Ramon Berenguer IV granted himself the right over pax et guerra (the peace and the war), especially in relations with the Moors, and which King Alfonso the Chaste would renew. Both claimed this right in their domains and the areas under their influence, but ended up delegating this to their representatives. In Wars in 12 th century catalonia. aristocracy and political leadership contrast, this theoretical pre-eminent position in the administration of the "peace and the war" favoured agreements about military strategy in the Peninsula with other leaders on the same level. The Count and then the King derived a certain authority from war, and this helped to reinforce their political leadership in such questions as relations with the other leaders in the Peninsula, more direct intervention in the conquered areas and greater control over their relations with the aristocracy. In fact, during the 12 th century, the aristocracy was reorganised and came under the leadership of important families in the region and the counts, like those of Barcelona or Urgell. The latter undertook various "pacifying" actions that meant the submission of the pacified nobles to their leadership, especially militarily, above all in the first half of the century. Moreover, by the second half of the century, the commitments to wage war on behalf of the lord had practically disappeared from the documents of enfeoffment. Significantly, the consolidation of the military and, partly, political leadership of the county of Barcelona derived from the exercise and control of the peace. The comital policies to achieve this pre-eminence varied, as did the agreements with the members of the nobility, which ranged from submission to their involvement in the great events. Furthermore, they dealt with ideological elements, like the crusading arguments, that contributed to the idea of a certain military specificity or specialisation and favoured the incorporation of new agents. The pacts with foreign allies were also important as these provided extra and extraordinary military powers over and above the local possibilities.
In 12 th -century Catalonia, the feudal wars coexisted with other larger enterprises, like those of conquest. They both corresponded to distinct levels of domination, of a regional or supra-regional scope. The new supra-regional military demands favoured the protagonism of county or royal power, "pacification" and the incorporation of new actors, who irreversibly broke the exclusive aristocratic control of military domination. The great military change in the mid-12 th century led to the move from wars for local private property to another style orientated towards "seizing" wide territories from the hands of the enemy. A military capacity and leadership became necessary, one that the feudal aristocracy was unable to offer due to its dynamics. Military efficiency, reached with new measures encouraged by the County of Barcelona, favoured the political consolidation of the Count at the head of a conglomerate of dominations, and over other aristocratic leaders who were very active until the mid century. Warfare was an essential demonstration of power, not so much as a derivation of politics, but more as a motor or stimulus of new social and political realities. However, attention to the various levels of military and political domination offers a complex image of 12 th -century Catalan political history with a plural reality, which is a counterpoint to historiographic readings with statist and presentistic approaches. These approaches have resulted in narratives that have oversized the political entity of the power of the Count of Barcelona, offering an ascendant lineal image of the formation of a feudal "state". In fact, the struggle for private ownership and appropriation prevailed, but these wars actually favoured political developments aimed at achieving maximum efficiency and military domination.
